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4 Goldfork Circle Drive #4 
Idaho City, Idaho 8371 
Petitioner-Appellant 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF LDAHO 






Dennis Sallaz, Daryl Sallaz, National ) 
Financial Services, Randolf Lewis, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Docket No. 43311 
District Court CVOC 1306926 
APPELLANT'S TYPE-WRITTEN 
REPLY BRIEFS 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District 
for Ada County. 
The Honorable Patrick Owen presiding. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The respondents are right, this case deals with damages from the loss of a residential 
property located at 1911 Second Street South, Nampa Idaho as the result of a deed of 
trust foreclosure that occurred in March 2013. And if the respondents did not admitted 
to (in their Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment) forgery (documents submitted to dismiss the case in Canyon 
County to support res judicata claims in Ada County), perjury (testifying that payments 
were made to catch up their payments in the arrears), abuse of process (in both federal 
bankruptcy laws and Idaho Statutes and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure). And the case 
was dismissed under the Judges' Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiff's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment which under res judicata, but never addressed the 
issues of forgery, pe1jury, and wrongful foreclosure. The district court judge concluded 
in his Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment until March 16, 2015, CR128-129, saying that "The ownership interests in the 
Nampa home were determined when Matthews quitclaimed the interests jointly to himself 
and Jacqueline. Each became a 50% owner. The divorce court determined that the 
Nampa home was community property. That finding has never been appealed. In 
connection with the divorce, .Jacqueline's attorneys filed an lien in the amount of $3,400. 
When the assignee of the attorney's claim and lien.filed to.foreclose that lien, the lien amount 
was alleged to have grown by a factor of about 10, to more than $32,000. Due to 
Jacqueline's default, the attorney's assignee was able to acquire all of Jacqueline's 50% 
interest .fiJr a credit bid of a fraction <?f the amount claimed as fees under the lien. Terrence's 
50% interest in the Nampa home was never affected or impacted by the 2009 lienforeclosure 
action. Neither Jacqueline's attorney or his assignees ever sold the Nampa home or took any 
action affecting Matthews' 50% interest. The lien foreclosure court ruled that Matthews 
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lacked standing to assert any of Jacqueline's defenses. That ruling essentially precluded 
vu,nm,u.,,,from litigating any of the same issues, or any issues that could have been raised in 
2009 lien foreclosure action The ruling in the 2009 lien foreclosure case 
c~f the issues which were raised or which could have been raised in the 2009 
lienforeclosure action. As a result, the Court will dismiss this case. Counseljbr defendants is 
directed to submit an appropriate form of judgment within ten (1 OJ days of the entry of this 
decision." The court said basically res judicata only applies to the issues in the Canyon 
County Court that this court discussed in his memorandum, but no mentioned on the 
issues of what transpired in the Ada County Courts and what led to the present lawsuit 
court ruling. Even though there was no final judgment in the Canyon County 
case. Since the final judgment came about and signed after appellant filed another 
lawsuit, which Dennis Sallaz got Judge Ford to allow them to file a forged Motion to 
Order and Judgment to support Sallaz' Motion for Summary Judgment in 
appellant's complaint filed in Ada County, (and supposedly Judge Ford informed Sallaz 
that he needed to file documents to close this case without infom1ing the appellant 
according to Sallaz' affidavit). So in essence there was no final judI::,'111ent in the Canyon 
County case. 
And appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 19, 2015 addressing 
the dismissal of this case. Saying "This comt appears to rely res judicata claims 
addressing 'same parties' 'same claims' saying 'there are three prior proceedings to the 
current action' The divorce action the 2009 attorney lien foreclosure and the 2011 
action. The first action did not claim forgery and fraud upon the court. The second claim 
made the allegations when Defendant Sallaz forged documents and submitted them to the 
Ada County Court to claim res judicata. There was no final judgment until after filing 
the claim in Ada County." 
The claims that Judge McKee could not address were never addressed in his court 
because it happened after a complaint was filed that the defendants committed fraud. 
And it was not until after the ruling in Judge McKee's court that they committed perjury, 
submitting false documents, and fraud. 
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A hearing was heard on this matter on April 23, 2014, appellant argued issues on 
res judicata did not apply to issues after the trial where appellant got back 50 percent, and 
not rents or a share of because the respondents paid the arrears 
payments current, showing documentation of a cashier check and ledger. And Judge 
Owen not addressing these issues presented in the Motion to Reconsider, says in a 
surprise, not to be challenged ruling that this ever being an issue, nor ever addressed, nor 
was appellant allowed to even address this, the judge says (no matter how defendants 
came about getting the property) says that the appellant was responsible for the payments 
on property. (This alone is grounds for appeal when not allowed to defend or address 
a surprise ruling). An Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration was filed on April 27, 
2015. 
A second Motion for Reconsideration was filed on April 27, 2025, the same day 
Judge Owen the Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration was filed.. Which 
questioned: (1) Did this court allow the plaintiff to address the new ruling this court 
made for the defendants? No. This court never allowed the plaintiff to address his 
argument for the defendants. After the court made a new ruling on nothing ever 
addressed as a defense by the defendants, and completely caught plaintiff by surprise, 
this court ended saying are there any other matters to discuss in this court? Where if 
asked if plaintiff wanted to address this surprise 'bombshell' ruling, the plaintiff who did 
not bring the paperwork wanted to bring up prior statements made by both courts, and 
testimony by defendants, so would have asked for a continuance to research this under 
'implied contracts'. Or what Judge Ford ordered plaintiff's (defendants) to do. Or that 
Plaintiff could not make payments if not 'sole owner' before quit claiming property to 
Randolf Lewis and the plaintiff. The plaintiff had a right to address an issue that this 
court for the first time brings to the plaintiff's attention. (defendant's may have been 
aware of this since they did not defend against the allegations made by plaintiff in which 
the defendant's attorney never said one word and didn't even take notes) ... (1) Was 
the plaintiff responsible for payments on the lien on the Nampa property after the Sheriff 
foreclosed on the property? This court ruled that plaintiff was responsible for the loan 
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on the property. When in fact the sole owner of the property on foreclosure was 
for the loan on the Nampa property, when Judge Ford said that Idaho 
was to be off first. And when they chose to keep the property, they 
responsible for payments made to Idaho Housing, even if the loan was still 
plai.ntiff s name. Since foreclosure and until plaintiff was given back 50% percent 
interest in the property, the defendant's were responsible to ensure the payments were 
made to Idaho Housing. Plaintiff was 011Jy responsible since given 50% percent interest 
in the property, and the property was foreclosed upon for payments not made since the 
'sole owners' took possession of the property. Because Idaho Housing would not have 
foreclosed on the property if the payments were paid since the trial. 
The court ruled on this matter in May 19th, 2015, without addressing the surprise 
ruling on if the appellant was responsible for payments between sheriff's sale and when 
awarded back 50 percent of the property on, CR 166-167, saying "it appearing that the 
motion is untimely under I.R.C.P. 59 (e), and is not permitted as a post-judgment motion 
for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. 11 ( a)(2)(B) of an order made by the Court under either 
Rule 59( e) or Rule 60(b ), and therefore the Court being fully informed" 
And 71 days after the final judgment the respondents filed a Memorandum for 
Fees, now saying the Motion to Reconsider was timely filed in order to attempt 
to stop any appeal of this cases. Which was discussed in the appellants brief at page 21 
saying "Seventy-one days after the Judgment the defendants filed a Memorandum of 
Costs, saying now the Motions to Reconsider were timely filed, but would not address 
surprise ruling by Judge Patrick Owen on appellant being responsible for payments 
between 2010 and 2013 when the property was sold at sheriffs sale and when the 
appellant was awarded 50% of the property, which the court said only 7 payments due 
after the court ruling were affected by the foreclosure." Then the court would not 
address the Motion to Reconsider as ·untimely'. 
B. Course of Proceedings Addressing Respondent's Arguments 
Now the respondents say at page 6, "Matthews filed a timely motion for 
reconsideration on March 19, 2015. . . and "Matthews then filed a second motion for 
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reconsideration on May 7, 2015, which was denied by the District Court May 19, 2015" 
out that the court cannot address this Motion to Reconsider because it was filed 
The confusion lied with the fact both the court and respondents both 
the Judge's Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiffs Second Motion 
Summary Judgment was a final judgment and would not acknowledge till after an 
appeal was filed and appellant argued the memorandum of fees exceeded the judge's 
ruling before the court and respondents now acknowledged that the Motions to 
Reconsider were filed in a timely matter, but left out the documents, and any mention 
that appellant was responsible for payments in a surprise ruling. So if now the Second 
Motion to Reconsider was filed timely, why was it not addressed? But the repository 
shows the Second Motion to Reconsider was filed and a copy attached to the Appellant's 
Brief filed wth the court not disputed. Add the Order Denying Second Motion to 
Reconsider document was entered into the record. 
Addressing Respondent's Statement of Facts C: The respondents in order to 
state that appellant was responsible for payments bet\veen sheriffs sale in 2010 and 
awarded back 50 percent of the property says at page 8 in their Response Brief, 
that "Appellant Mathews was a part owner between 1999 and 2013." Leaving out the 
period that appellant did not have any deed to the property. When in fact the Sheriffs 
Sale which directed the sale to payoff Idaho Housing first, the whole amount owed to 
the respondent's second and then divide the proceeds between appellant and 
respondents, shows the respondents were responsible for payoff/payments on the 
property in the interim until appellant was awarded the property back. The respondents 
say at page 11, "The Sallaz attorney's fee lien, as construed below, was only imposed 
against Mitchell's undivided half interest in the Nampa property. (so why did the 
sheriffs sale attach the over $37,000 against the property to be paid off before dividing 
the proceeds?) At page 13, the respondents say (which is an issue to contend with) 
"Matthews' continuing obligation as the sole individual responsible on the underlying 
note and deed of trust to IHF A remained unimpaired as a result of the Canyon County 
foreclosure action. (which is saying between the Sheriff Sale and when awarded 50 % 
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interest in the property in 2013, appellant who was no longer on any title or deed was 
responsible for the payments on the property?) 
The respondents say at page 16, "Shortly thereafter ( court ruling that payments 
were caught up and made current) Mr. Lewis ceased making the monthly payments on 
the property and moved out of the residence ... (when in fact payments were in the 
an·ears since the last payment made by appellant in September 2010). So how can Mr. 
Lewis cease making payments when he nor Sallaz until he signed over to the property to 
Lewis ever made a payment on the property? 
111e respondents say at page 17, pertaining to the check testified to and submitted 
to the court, "That check was in fact tendered and was included by IHFA's transaction 
history for the loan" (An admission no where did they say when they never made 
payments on the place did they state appellant was responsible for the payments, 
otherwise the court would have probably given the property back or given them control 
of the property) ... Matthews had failed to establish that anyone within the Sallaz group 
of defendants had any enforceable obligation to make the payments secured by the deed 
trust. (How about Judge Ford's ruling that Idaho Housing and Finance be paid off 
first at Sheriff's sale?) If this was true then why didn't Judge McKee give appellant 
back control of the property, saying because they caught up the payments and were 
cmrent on payments they would have physical and financial use of the property? 
A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting Summary Judgment For The 
Defendant Respondents On Res Judicata saying that res judicata was the basis to 
deny admitted (1) forgery. Then talks about the Canyon County case that had 
nothing to do with forgery. Forgery was committed in Canyon County when 
Raymond Schild came forward and said the documents to sell the Nampa property 
were not authorized, condoned, typed or submitted by him ... (2) perjury. Is 
"likewise barred by res judicata in this proceeding." P.25 response briefs ... (3) 
Circumvention Of Civil & Bankruptcy Rules (Abuse of Process) -- res judicata 
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may apply here, except the appellant did appeal this action and the Supreme Court 
essentiaily that even as co-defendant, appellant cannot argue procedural issues 
wrongs done by both the court (absolute immunity) and attorneys for Jacqueline 
Mitchell. That may be the only issue that can be precluded if a trial is granted ... 
It is interesting at page 26 of Respondent's brief said underlined determines that 
title to the subiect propertv is held 50% by National and is encumbered by 
the first lien of IHF A (then not bolded showing National takes most of 
appellants share of the property) and the second lien of National. And again 
says "proceeds to be disbursed to payy off the first lien of IHF A, then to pay off 
the second lien held by National, with any remaining proceeds to be split equally 
between Defendant Matthews and National." That shows that any sale would be 
for anyone to bid on it to pay off over $80,000. But this is just added information 
not related to the Argument, but helps explain that the respondents had 
encumbered appellant's 50 % percent. (4) The Alleged "Wrongful foreclosure" 
Of The Nampa Property In 2013 As Allegedly Caused By Acts Of The 
Defendants/Respondents - - at page 28, the respondents state (at court in 2012), 
the subject property was now titled in the names of, and held by, Terrence 
Matthews and Randolf Lewis. It was not until appellant received the quit claim 
deed in 2012 and they gave the appellant and the court an accounting of moneys 
paid to IFHA that the appellant would become responsible for payments. It was 
only because the respondents caught up and kept the payments current that 
allowed them to have physical control of the property. And that correctly ended 
the lawsuit and the complaint was dismissed. But the respondent is incorrect 
when they said that "Matthews and Lewis had been cotenants of the Nampa 
property for about 2 years." It was October 5th , 2012. And the property was 
foreclosed upon in March, 2013 so in essence appellant would only be liable for 6 
months of payments, because the judge would have given appellant physical use 
of the property to avoid foreclosure since he did not know that appellant was 
responsible for the payments. 
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B. The Appellant Matthews Has Failed to. Raise Any Issue On This Appeal That 
Challenged Decision Of The District Court Granting Summary Judgment To The 
Respondents The respondents say that the complete record was not used to 
support his claims. And records for what ever reason was not included, the 
appellant took from the repository and document that were not put forth from the 
repository the appellant attached that document. The record produced to this 
court from the repository which addresses the Second Motion to Reconsider 
shows that Judge Owen made a surprise ruling and the Order Dismissing the 
Action shows it was dismissed as 'untimely', when it was not. Just like the 
record shows that Judge Owen only addressed the Canyon County Court rulings 
in his res judicata. And that is from the RECORD ... At page 33, respondents 
say "Matthews undivided half interest in the Nampa property was unaffected by 
the lien of foreclosure sale." When in fact at the time of the sheriff sale appellant 
lost the property, had no deed, when the whole property was sold in March 2010. 
Then respondents argue at page 34 -36, address that the disparity of how an 
Attorney Lien went from $3,400 to $34,000 was in no position to object to this ... 
and discusses a couple cases which appellant will further argue in his arguments .. 
. And respondents stated that Idaho Code 5-216 applies a five (5) year statute of 
limitations on an action on a contract ... Again issues dealing with legal 
procedure can be ignored if the defendant does not answer the complaint. . . In 
alleged perjury, the sworn testimony and documents presented to show the court 
the payments were current were disingenuous at best. INDINGENUOUS: 
insincere, dishonest, untruthful, false, deceitful, duplicitous, lying, mendacious 
hypocritical. Twice the Appellant raised issues on this appeal that challenged the 
decision of the District Court in Granting Summary Judgment to the Respondents. 
In appellant's brief pp 18-21, says, the first issued in filing his first Motion to 
Reconsidered, says "Upon filing a Motion to Reconsider on March 19, 2015, 
showing 41 exhibits (CR 135 - 163) appellant was going to submit to the court 
saying "This court appears to rely res judicata claims addressing 'same 
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parties' 'same claims' saying 'there are three prior proceedings to the 
current action' The divorce action the 2009 attorney lien foreclosure and 
the 2011 action. The first action did not claim forgery and fraud upon the 
court. The second claim made the allegations when Defendant Sallaz 
forged documents and submitted them to the Ada County Court to claim 
res judicata. There was no final judgment until after filing the claim in Ada 
County. So the claims that Judge McKee could not address where never 
addressed in his court because it happened after a complaint was filed 
that the defendants committed fraud. And it was not until after the ruling in 
Judge McKee's court that they committed perjury, submitting false 
documents, and fraud. And the court stating plaintiff was given 50 percent 
of the property then allowed the defendants to attach their lien to the 
whole property again does not fall under res judicata. Finally this court 
addresses Final Judgment: This court uses the divorce as the final 
judgment to justify the defendants to justify the defendants circumventing 
the statutes and rules of civil procedure of Idaho. Saying the 'Interest of 
Justice' an exception to all claims when a gross wrong is done." 
The second issue presented to this court said concerning the filing of 
appellant's Second Motion to Reconsider, says "At a Hearing on April 23, 2015, 
after a statement read to the court which appellant argued the issues that had 
since transpired since the last court which do no fall under res judicata. Judge 
Patrice Own stated that it was appellant's fault that the property was foreclosed 
upon, that Jacqueline was not on the loan, and thus respondents were not on the 
loan, and since appellant refused or failed to make payments on the Nampa 
property it was appellant responsibility for making payments on the property. 
And Judge Patrick Owen would not even put this into writing in any document 
on this statement made. But appellant filed a Second Motion to Reconsider on 
April 27t\ 2015 (Which was part of the record and will attach a copy as an 
Plaintiff's Attachment# 3). 
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Portions of the Second Motion to Reconsider are read "the court said at 
8, "In the pretrial order, I concluded that the Complaint as initially drafted 
contained many issues not litigablc in this case. Most of the 
pertained to Plaintiff's attempt to relitigate issues fully resolved in the 
County litigation (In other words none of plaintiffs business) .. Other issues 
would relate to issues presented after filing the lawsuit in the present case .... The 
judgment directs that a foreclosure sale shall be held with proceeds to be 
disbursed to first pay off the first lien of IHFA, then to pay off the second lien 
held by National, with any remaining proceeds to be split equally between 
Defendant Matthews and National. . . . Now since they were ordered to pay off 
IHF A first in their bid, and choose not to, then they would be responsible to 
payoff, make payments or ensure that Idaho Housing and Finance Association 
were kept current. As sole owners they chose to keep the property, so they would 
be liable to keep payments current or sell off the property and payoff Idaho 
Housing. The credit bid guaranteed that Idaho Housing was covered, which was 
not used or applied to the bid. Except plaintiff was awarded half, and would not 
be liable on the loan until given or awarded half the property, since the property 
was taken awav from him, he was not liable for any loan. In fact, plaintiff would 
not be liable until he got 50 percent ownership of the property. . . and even if 
circumvented Federal Bankruptcy laws, it don't apply. So in essence they admit 
everything. And plaintiff argued these issues showing they are responsible and 
could be held liable for their acts. But the court dismissed this case based on res 
judicata and filed this under the guise in a Memorandum Decision and Order RE: 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment which was filed March 4tn, 
2015. Not a Notice to Dismiss or even an Order to Dismiss. It should have been 
an 'Order Dismissing Case' or the like. So the plaintiff files a Motion to 
Reconsider after document was mailed to wrong address, and the defendants 
argue every issue is subject to this courts res judicata claims ... at page 27 - 28 as 
Plaintiffs Attachment #2 says "So the claims that Judge McKee could not address 
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where never addressed in his court because it happened after a complaint was 
filed that the defendants committed fraud. And it was not until after the ruling 
McKee's court that they committed perjury, submitting false documents, 
and fraud. And the court stating plaintiff was given 50 percent of the property 
then allowed the defendants to attach their lien to the whole property again does 
not fall under res judicata. Finally this court addresses Final Judgment. This 
court uses the divorce as the final judgment to justify the defendants to justify the 
defendants circumventing the statutes and rules of civil procedure of Idaho. 
Saying the 'Interest of Justice' an exception to all claims when a gross wrong is 
done." That "Motions for Reconsideration must be evaluated in light of the 
doctrine of the law of the case and a court may only revisit and reverse a prior 
ruling ... on one of five specified grounds ... (I) a clearly erroneous prior ruling, 
(3) substantially different evidence, (5) ( especially in that manifest injustice 
would result were the prior ruling permitted to stand ... Failure to apply the 
doctrine of the law of the case absent one of the [five] requisite conditions 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. US v Alexander 106 F3d 874, 876 (9th Cir 
1997)." 
The Respondents ,\re Entitled to .An Award of Attorney's Fees On Appeal Under 
LC 12-12-121 Since this case is not frivolous, since the Dismissal of 
appellant's Summary Judgment under the Judge's MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE; PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT does not apply res 
judicata to actions after the Canyon County Court, and the Court at appellant's Motion 
for Reconsideration did not address any res judicata issues, made a ruling without 
opportunity to address the ruling, then filed another Motion to Reconsider to have it 
denied as 'untimely'. And issues of admitted perjury, forgery, and fraud are issues not 
addressed in appellant's summary judgment, so res judicata does not apply. Now that 
they admit to this in their memorandum it opens the door to actual admissions to 
allow the court to sanction Dennis Sallaz. 
D. This Court Should Impose Sanctions Under Idaho Appellate Rule 11. Against 
Appellant Matthews For Pursuing Issues That He Does Not Have Standing To 
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Raise and Present To The Courts Talk about the kettle being painted black. 
Anytime someone files a complaint, it is through Discovery and Production of 
Documents, Summary Judgement, and Hearings that the truth comes out. Justice 
is supposedly after the truth. This is whether one goes into civil or criminal 
courts, federal district or federal bankruptcy courts. The appellant got most of his 
documents from the respondents; the cashier check that respondents already 
admitted they testified it was to cure a default, and a ledger showing payments 
were current. The Affidavit admitting circumventing Federal Bankruptcy Laws. 
The Memorandum in Opposition of Summary Judgment with a lot of admissions 
to breaking the law. Maybe appellant can't raise all stuff allowed into court in 
blatant disregard for the Rules of Civil Procedure, Statute of Limitation, Federal 
Bankruptcy Laws. But this is a starting point to correct the wrongs done here. 
So should an appellant be sanctioned for trying to get the court to answer 
the following questions? 
1. If a judge does not have jurisdiction unless a complaint has been filed in a 
timely matter. Why does only the defendant the only one to have standing to 
address the statute of limitation? If this is true, anybody can file a lawsuit 
anytime in the future after the statute of limitation if the defendant is not found. 
2. If a party cannot be found after the statute of limitation, a person can 
publish in the last known area newspaper, in the last known address where they 
have not live in for years. 
3. Can bankruptcy protected property be sold to pay an attorney fees? 
Appellant found he cannot file issues dealing with the courts in federal court, 
having it dismissed without prejudice and has legal assistance ( counsel) willing to 
help when this is addressed it this court to why bankruptcy protected property is 
being ignored in this case. 
4. Should res judicata apply to other issues of pei:jury, forgery and fraud, 
when the court only concluded in a Summary Judgment that appellant gave 50% 
of the property to ex-wife? 
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5. If the courts only issue under Summary Judgment was "That ruling 
essentially precluded Matthews from relitigating any of the same issues, or any issues 
that could have been raised in the 2009 lien foreclosure action. The ruling in the 2009 
lien foreclosure case bars consideration of the issues which were raised or which 
could have been raised in the 2009 lien foreclosure action." And this is the crux of 
the respondents' case. Then the other issues of perjury, forgery and fraud go back to 
their initial argument of admissions that Sallaz did circumvent federal bankruptcy 
laws, state statutes, commit perjury, fraud, and forgery in their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 
December 30th, 2014. 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 1 
(I) The district court erred in granting Summary Judgment for the 
Respondents on the basis of res judicata. (Same argument as Appellant's Argument # 1) 
Judge Owen dismissed this case under a Memorandum Decision and Order RE: 
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment after a Pre-trial Conference was to be 
held. And concluded CR 128-129 that "The ownership interests in the Nampa home 
were determined when Matthews quitclaimed the interests jointly to himself and 
Jacqueline. Each became a 50% owner. The divorce court determined that the Nampa 
home was community property. That.finding has never been appealed In connection with 
the divorce, Jacqueline's attorneys filed an lien in the amount o/$3,400. When the assignee 
of the attorney's claim and lien filed to foreclose that lien, the lien amount was alleged to 
have grown by a factor of about 10, to more than $32,000. Due to Jacqueline's default, the 
attorney'.~ assignee was able to acquire all of Jacqueline's 50% interest for a credit bid <~fa 
fraction of the amount claimed as fees under the lien. Terrence's 50% interest in the Nampa 
home was never affected or impacted by the 2009 lien foreclosure action. Neither 
Jacqueline's attorney or his assignees ever sold the Nampa home or took any action qffecting 
Matthews' 50% interest. The lienfhreclosure court ruled that Matthews lacked standing to 
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assert any of Jacqueline's defenses. That ruling essentially precluded Matthews from 
litigating any of the same issues, or any issues that could have been raised in the 2009 
action. The ruling in the 2009 lien ji:Jreclosure case bars consideration of the 
issues which were raised or which could have been raised in the 2009 lien foreclosure action. 
a result, the Court will dismiss this case. Counse/f<Jr defendants is directed to submit an 
appropriatefhrm ofjudgment within ten (10) days <~f the entry c~fthis decision." 
The respondents apply res judicata to the issues NEVER addressed of admitted 
fraud, perjury and forgery. But more interesting is the court judge did not dismiss the 
case from any motion filed by respondents. Nowhere in the judge's Memorandum 
dismissing this case does he apply res judicata to issues that have since found that the 
respondents committed perjury saying payments were caught up and current, forgery 
when they forged documents to cause the sale and dismissing the case in Canyon County 
and fraud on the court when they submitted false documents showing payments were 
caught up, causing the foreclosure of the Nampa property. And nowhere in the motion 
for summary judgment did it mention anything about who was responsible for the 
payments on the Nampa property. More importantly, besides not having any reference to 
the above, there are no documents submitted by the respondent in their short Answer, or 
their admission in the Motion and Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment. Nor did 
the court in the Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiff's Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment did the court even mention that appellant was responsible for the 
payments. But more importantly dismissing the case as 'untimely' without addressing 
this was really strange, besides the court not producing the Second Motion to Reconsider 
and the court not making any reference to the Second Motion to Reconsider in denying 
the motion without a hearing, again the judge as at hearing, in appellant's Second Motion 
to Reconsider and again in the one sentence saying Memorandum Decision and Order 
RE: Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment denial as 'untimely.' Then 
denying this Motion saying "it appearing that the motion is untimely under LR.C.P. 59 
( e), and is not permitted as a post-judgment motion for reconsideration under LR.C.P. 11 
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(a)(2)(B) of an order made by the Court under either Rule 59( e) or Rule 60(b ), and 
the Court being fully informed" 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUfvfENT 2 
(2) Did the appellant raise all issues on appeal that has challenged the decision 
of the court in granting Summary Judgment? 
Since the only issue addressed in the Courts' Memorandum dismissing the case 
dealt with only the Canyon County case and ownership of the property between parties, 
appellant argued all issues in his two Motions to Reconsider were filed addressing 
appellant's Summary Judgment issues and Surprise ruling by the court. The first, the 
court did not address any issues CR 159 saying that "the claims that Judge McKee could 
not address where never addressed in his court because it happened after a complaint was 
filed that the defendants committed fraud. And it was not until after the ruling in Judge 
McKee's court that they committed perjury, submitting false doctunents, and fraud. And 
the court stating plaintiff was given 50 percent of the property then allowed the 
defendants to attach their lien to the whole property again does not fall under res judicata. 
Finally this court addresses Final Judgment. This court uses the divorce as the final 
judgment to justify the defendants to justify the defendants circumventing the statutes and 
rules of civil procedure of Idaho." presented by the appellant on his Motion to 
Reconsider and oral argument, where the court made a surprise ruling on appellant was 
responsible for the payments. The second attempt was a Second Motion to Reconsider to 
address issues of responsibility of the payments was submitted by the appellant one day 
after the hearing, but dismissed as untimely, So besides already argued in briefs the 
surprise ruling was made by this court. Saying that plaintiff was responsible to ensure 
the payments were to be made, even without possession or able to collect the rents that 
co-owners were allowed to collect and have possession of the property. Nor giving 
appellant an opportunity to address this, and attempted to bring this out in a timely 
Second Motion to Reconsider, to have it dismissed as untimely. The respondents apply 
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res judicata to the issues of admitted fraud, perjury and forgery. But more interesting is 
court judge did not dismiss the case from any motion filed by respondents. He 
this case under a Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiffs Second 
for Summary Judgment. And concluded "The mvnership interests in the Nampa 
home were determined when Matthews quitclaimed the interests jointly to himself and 
Jacqueline. Each became a 50% o~ner. The divorce court determined that the Nampa 
home was community property. That finding has never been appealed. In connection with 
the divorce, Jacqueline's attorneys filed an lien in the amount of $3,400. When the assignee 
of the attorney's claim and lien filed to foreclose that lien, the lien amount was alleged to 
grown by a factor of about I 0, to more than $32,000. Due to Jacqueline's default, the 
attorney's assignee was able to acquire all of Jacqueline's 50% interest for a credit bid of a 
fraction of the amount claimed as fees under the lien. Terrence's 50% interest in the Nampa 
home was never affected or impacted by the 2009 lien foreclosure action. Neither 
Jacqueline's attorney or his assignees ever sold the Nampa home or took any action affecting 
Matthews' 50% interest. The lien foreclosure court ruled that Matthews lacked standing to 
assert any of Jacqueline's defenses. That ruling essentially precluded Matthews from 
litigating any of the same issues, or any issues that could have been raised in the 2009 lien 
foreclosure action. The ruling in the 2009 lien foreclosure case bars consideration of the 
issues which were raised or which could have been raised in the 2009 lien foreclosure action. 
As a result, the Court will dismiss this case. Counsel for defendants is directed to submit an 
appropriate form of judgment within ten ( l 0) days of the entry of this decision." 
Nowhere in the judge's Memorandum dismissing this case does he apply res 
judicata to issues that have since found that the respondents committed perjury saying 
payments were caught up and current, forgery when they forged documents to cause the 
sale and dismissing the case in Canyon County and fraud on the court when they 
submitted false documents showing payments were caught up, causing the foreclosure of 
the Nampa property. And nowhere in the motion for summary judgment did it mention 
anything about who was responsible for the payments on the Nampa property. More 
importantly, besides not having any reference to the above, there are no documents 
submitted by the respondent in their short Answer, or their admission in the Motion and 
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Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment. Nor did the court in the Memorandum 
Decision and Order RE: Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment did the court 
even mention that appellant was responsible for the payments. But more importantly 
dismissing the case as 'untimely' without addressing this was really strange, besides the 
court not producing the Second Motion to Reconsider and the court not making any 
reference to the Second Motion to Reconsider in denying the motion without a hearing, 
the judge as at hearing, in appellant's Second Motion to Reconsider and again in 
the one sentence saying Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Plaintiff's Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment denial as 'untimely.' Then denying this Motion saying 
"it appearing that the motion is untimely under LR.C.P. 59 (e), and is not permitted as a 
post-judgment motion for reconsideration under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) of an order made by 
the Court under either Rule 59( e) or Rule 60(b ), and therefore the Court being fully 
informed" So if the Judgment is filed on March 13, 2015 and the first Motion to 
Reconsider was filed on March 19, 2015. That is six (6) days. And order denying 
Motion to Reconsider was made on April 27, 2015 and the Second Motion to Reconsider 
was filed on April 27. 2015 on the surprise ruling appellant was not allowed to address at 
court. That is only one ( 1) day? So if the Judgment is filed on March 13, 2015 and the 
Motion to Reconsider was filed on March 19, 2015. That is six (6) days. And order 
denying Motion to Reconsider was made on April 27, 2015 and the Second Motion to 
Reconsider wa'> filed on April 27, 2015 on the surprise ruling appellant was not allowed 
to address at court. That is only one ( 1) day? 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 2 
(2) Did the district court erroneously rule that the court only attached to 
appellant's portion of the property? 
The Respondents say that they did not attach any portion of the appellant's 
property in the sale of the property, and then admit that "National Financial" now the 
second lien holder on the property would be paid fully before funds would be distributed 
between appellant and respondents. As argued in the initial Appellant's Brief (argument 
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2, page 25) 'The judgment directs that a foreclosure sale shall be held with 
proceeds to be disbursed to first pay off the first lien of IHFA, then to pay off the 
second lien by National, with any remaining proceeds to be split equally between 
Defendant Matthews and National.?' 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 3 
(3) Can real property be sold to satisfy an attorneys' lien? 
Common law recognizes two types of attorney liens to secure payment of attorney fees. 
The first type of attorney lien is called the general, retaining, or possessory lien (the "retaining 
lien").1 The retaining lien "of an attorney is his right to retain possession of all documents, 
money, or other property of his client coming into his hands professionally until a general 
balance due him for professional services is paid.''s An attorney could not apparently use a 
retaining lien to obtain a security interest in a client's real property. The second type of attorney 
lien is called the special, particular, or charging lien (the "charging lien"). The charging lien "of 
an attorney is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to him for services in a suit 
secured to him 0ut of the judgment or recovery in that particular suit .... Logically, an attorney 
could use a charging lien to acquire a security interest in a client's real property, where the 
attorney's services obtain title to, or possession of, such property for the client. 
A lawyer may bring a collection lawsuit against a former client and obtain a money 
judgment for the unpaid legal billings. However, possession of a money judgment does not 
automatically give rise to a lien against the judgment debtor's real property. Instead, the 
judgment creditor is first required to satisfy the judgment through execution against the 
judgment debtor's personal property. If such personal property is insufficient to satisfy the 
judgment, then the judgment creditor may seek execution against the judgment debtor's real 
property. 
Executions against realty shall command the officer to whom they are directed to make 
execution against the realty of the judgment debtor only after execution has been made against 
the personal property of the judgment debtor that is in the county, and such personal property is 
insufficient to meet the sum of money and costs for which judgment was rendered." 
U.S. district court in Rubel v Brimacombe & Schlecte, PC. 86 BR 81 (ED Mich 1988) There, 
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plaintiff initially retained defendant law firm to represent her in a divorce action. Plaintiff discharged 
defendant while the action was still pending, retaining substitute counsel. In the stipulation and order of 
substitution, defendant inserted a provision granting itself a lien against trial or settlement proceeds to 
secure of its fees, unbeknownst to plaintiff. Under the judgment of divorce, plaintiff was awarded 
the marital home. Defendant, not having received full payment from plaintiff, recorded a "notice of claim 
of interest" against the marital home with the register of deeds. In plaintiff's Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
proceeding, she sought to discharge defendant's lien, alleging it was a dischargeable judicial lien under the 
Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court, applying Michigan law, ruled that defendant had an attorney's 
charging lien, which was based in common law and was therefore non-dischargeable. An attorney's 
charging lien for fees could not attach to the client's real property. The district court noted that 
Michigan case law had not yet addressed the issue: "The courts of Michigan have not ruled 
directly on the issue of whether an attorney's charging lien may attach to real property."19 The 
court then concluded that Michigan courts would adhere to the rule followed by a majority of 
other states: "[I] conclude that in Michigan courts would follow the majority rule disallowing 
attorney's liens on real property unless there is an express contract between the parties or 
special equitable circumstances exist." Applying that rule to the case at hand, the district court 
held that defendant did not have a valid lien against the marital home and reversed the 
bankruptcy court's ruling. The Court of Appeals framed the issue on appeal as "whether 
an attorneys' lien can attach to a client's real property."26 Initially, the court identified the 
retaining lien and the charging lien as the types of attorney liens recognized by Michigan law, 
and described the general nature of each type of lien.21 Regarding the charging lien, the court 
noted that it attaches to "a judgment, settlement, or other money recovered as a result of the 
attorney's services," and that "[c]ase law acts as the sole guide with regard to these liens."zsThe 
court specifically found that the defendant's asserted lien was a charging lien: "In this case, 
defendant is asserting the right to a charging lien." So the precise issue before the court was 
actually whether an attorney's charging lien can attach to a client's real property. The Court of 
Appeals then described the process by which a creditor may obtain and execute a judgment 
against a debtor, including a debtor's real property. Regarding the attachment of a charging 
lien, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that "these liens automatically attach to funds or a 
money judgment recovered through the attorney's services," 
The Court of Appeals states, "disallowing attorney liens upon real property owned by 
clients unless there is an express written contract between the parties providing for such a lien or 
unless special equitable circumstances existed." 
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Combining the majority rule in other states of an attorney's charging lien against a client's real 
attorney's charging lien for foes may not be imposed upon the real estate a 
even if the attorney has successfully prosecuted a suit to establish a client's title or 
recover title or possession for the client, unless: 
( 1) the parties have an express agreement providing for a lien, 
(2) the attorney obtains a judgment for the fees and follows the proper procedure for 
enforcing a judgment, or 
(3) special equitable circumstances exist to warrant imposition of a lien. 
The "express agreement" must specifically provide for a lien on real property .. that "AT-
TORNEYS shall have general, possessory or retaining CLIENT'S liens, and all special or 
charging liens known to law[.]" When the client did not pay the attorney's invoices, the attorney 
recorded a lien against the client's real property, which had been awarded to the client under the 
judgment of divorce. (Because the real property was obtained as the result of the attorney's 
services, it was plausible for the attorney to assert an attorney's charging lien against such 
property.) 
"In the absence of a written contract, an equitable lien will be established only where, 
the relations of the parties, there is a clear intent to use an identifiable piece of property 
as security for a debt." A lawyer may assert an equitable lien against a client's real property, 
based on an agreement with the client that such real property would serve as security for payment 
of the attorney's fees. 
fn 1989, the State Bar of Michigan Professional Ethics Committee considered whether it 
was ethical for a lawyer to acquire an interest in the client's non-litigated real property, in 
Michigan Ethics Opinion RI-40. The committee opined that a lawyer may take a mortgage 
against the client's real property in order to secure payment of anticipated legal fees, provided 
that the real property is not the subject matter of litigation in which the lawyer represents the 
client, and provided that the requirements of MRPC l .8(a) are satisfied. "A lawyer may obtain a 
mortgage on a client's property provided the lawyer complies with MRPC l.8(a), and the 
prop4~rty which the mortgage secures is not the subject matter of litigation the lawyer is 
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conducting for the clientf .]''61 "If the interest charged is usurious, the terms of the transaction are 
nol fair reasonable to the client and violate MRPC l.8(a)(1). 
In Michigan Ethics Opinion RI-354, the lawyer was representing a client in a contested 
divorce case. The marital estate consisted of one asset: the equity in the marital home. The 
husband and wife owned the marital home as tenants by the entireties. The lawyer desired to take 
a lien against the marital home in order to secure payment of legal fees. The lawyer anticipated 
that his client would receive, under the judgment of divorce, and as the result of the la\\>yer' s 
services, either sole or joint interest in the marital home. 
The lawyer proposed a two-step transaction. First, the client would execute a warranty 
deed conveying the client's interest in the marital home to the lawyer. Second, upon entry of the 
judgment of divorce, the lawyer would re-convey title to the marital home to the client, in 
exchange for the client's execution of a promissory note and mortgage against the home. 
The committee initially noted that the proposed lien would have to satisfy the three 
requirements of MRPC 1.8( a) (i.e., fair and reasonable terms; opportunity to consult independent 
counsel; and client's written consent). The committee then referenced MI Eth Op RI-40 (1989), 
which had opined that a lawyer may take a mortgage against the client's non-litigated real 
property in order to secure payment of anticipated legal fees. 
APPELLANT ARGUMENT 4 
(4) Did Respondent Sallaz circumvent the Federal Bankruptcy Laws? 
(Including attaching appellant's portion of bankruptcy protected property). 
In a Memorandum of Decision filed on April 15, 2004, where appellant objected 
to the allowance of two proofs of claims by Dennis Sallaz and former spouse. Sallaz has 
also filed a motion to revoke Chapter 13 plan by fraud ... Sallaz said appellant owed him 
$10,632.68 for legal services provided to Ms Mitchell and spouse alleged appellant owed 
ex-wife $109,000. That fraud was based on valuation of the 4 parcels of property ... and 
because the bankruptcy estate does not include her interest in any former community 
property, Debtor owes Ms. Mitchell nothing ... That Ms. Mitchell obviously overstated 
her claim against appellant and the bankruptcy estate ... that Ms Mitchell would be 
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to $18,000 from property sale proceeds ... the state court divorce decree granted 
no against the debtor's property ... for purposes of this bankruptcy case, Ms. 
Mitchell's claim is unsecured ... Appellant objects to Mr. Sallaz' proof of claim because, 
he says, he owes M. Sallaz nothing. . . divorce decree provided that each party is 
responsible for the payment of his or her own attoney fees. Appellant also suggest that 
because his bankiuptcy estate includes only bis undivided one-half interest in the real 
property, Mr. Sallaz holds no lien on any property of the bankruptcy estate ... Debtor is 
not indebted to Mr. Sallaz ... when the state court entered its decree of divorce, appellant 
and Ms. Mitchell ceased to own any community property ... Mr. Sallaz has no basis to 
assert a claim against appellant's bankruptcy estate ... (page 13) ... Furthermore, the 
legitimacy of Mr. Sallaz's liens is doubtful, even were there any property of the 
bankruptcy estate to which those liens could attach. In Idaho, an attorney is limited by 
the types of liens that may be asserted against a client's property. Permissible liens 
include either "possessory" or "charging" liens. See Dearborn Constr. Inc 03.11.B.C.R. 
17, 19 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002) (citing Frazee v Frazee, 660 P2d 928 (Idaho 1983). 
Because Mr. Sallaz's liens are not asserted against any "documents, money or other 
property obtained in his professional capacity,: Frazee, at 929, he likely can not assert a 
possessory lien against the real estate. And because a charging lien merely allows an 
attorney to assert an interest in a client's cause of action, and in any judgment or money 
award procured by attorney's services, Idaho Code § 3-205, Mr. Sallaz' s liens on 
Debtor's real property would not likely be within his reach. See In re Harris, 258 B.R. 8, 
13-14 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000)(Denying attorney's claim of a charging lien in monies held 
by the trustee because there was no "fund" created by the attorney's services). Moreover, 
"[t]he plain language of [Idaho Code § 3-205] allows a lien in favor of a lawyer solely 
against the lawyer's client, not against the adverse party to the litigation." Elsaesser v 
Raeon (In re Goldberg), 235 B.R. 476, 484-85 (Bankr. D. Idaho l 999)(Citing Frazee, 660 
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P2d at 930). Given the facts here, Mr. Sallaz has not shown he has holds a valid lien on 
nr,n,P•rn, of the Debtor or bankruptcy estate to secure payment of his fees ... " 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 5 
(5) Are jurists and attorneys sti11 bound by the Idaho Codes, rules of civil 
procedure and statutes even if a oartv does not or unable to resoond to a comolaint? 
.._ ..L "' I. I. 
Where does res judicata apply if these issues in third district court were 
supposively none of the appellant's business. Just for the record appellant wants this 
court to just answer the question. Even if the main defendant in the case did not respond 
to the complaint ( and listed also of a defendant in this complaint, he was required to file 
an ANSWER to this complaint, where appellant was required to answer the complaint. 
So in essence listed as a defendant, the appellant can and should have been able to 
respond to the complaint as a whole. If a complaint was filed against the appellant listed 
as a defendant, then the appellant had the right to challenge the validity of the complaint 
filed also against him. And question if a judge can take jurisdiction of any case that has 
surpassed the statute oflimitation (especially when the appellant is listed as a defendant)? 
Has this ever happened? If a defendant fails to respond to a complaint-summons, then 
plaintiffs can circumvent the rules of civil procedure? Don't have to give an accounting 
and make up a figure? 
So in essence this can set a precedent for even the appellant to file a lawsuit several 
years past the statute of limitation, publish last known address several years earlier, not have 
to give an accounting and the courts will not question statute of limitation, accounting or any 
rules of civil procedure if the defendant does not respond to your complaint. This is so the 
appellant is not giving bad advise and can use this case to show that plaintiff's filing lawsuits 
from someone owing monies several years ago past the statute of limitation can still file a 
lawsuit, name an amount and foreclose on personal or real property? And if denied, use this 
case as a recent decision to set a precedent in an appeal using this courts· or the district 
courts' ruling to allow this to use a new ruling that unless the defendant disputes a rule of 
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law: statute of limitation, accounting, service or any other procedure, a plaintiff can 
circumvent state rules and statutes? 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 6 
(6) Does res judicata apply to perjury to the court when respondents testified 
that the payments were current and had caught up the payments, produced false 
documentation that the payments were caught up (cashier check) and current (ledger)? 
(Especially when the court did not dismiss the case addressing any of these issues under 
res judicata). 
Since Judge Owen did not even reference the issues that brought about the present 
lawsuit dismissing this case dealing of the split of the property and issues dealing with 
the Third Judicial District Court rulings not appealable ( even through appellant tried). 
Res Judicata applies where the issues have the same parties which does apply here. Same 
claims which does not apply here, since the claims for the most part here came about 
after the Ada County case was settled where the appellant got back 50% share of the 
Nampa property, but would not get a share of the profits because the respondents had 
caught up their back payments and taxes in the arrears and had kept them current. To 
find they made no payments, did not catch up the arrears, saying they were not able to 
assume the loan on the property. Which is not an issue, since they could apply the 
payments to the loan on the property. And if appellant was responsible for and made the 
payments then the court would obviously given appellant control of the property or it 
would have been an issue in another claim. 
The case should have never been dismissed. The court could have ruled that only 
he issues dealing with what transpired since the previous court ruling on fraud and 
per:jury to that court. Then the appellant could only use other issues as laying foundation 
that lead to the perjury, fraud and forgery to the court. But to dismiss the case only on 
the issue of ownership of the property in question and issues leading to the sale of the 
property and not address the other issues that took place in the previous court and 
admissions by the respondents. 
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APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 7 
Was appellant responsible for payments or paying off Idaho Housing 
the Nampa property was sold at sheriff's sale (especially when the court orders that 
respondents were respondents were responsible to payoff Idaho Housing). 
The Third District Court Judge in his Judgement said . . . that appellant was 
responsible for payments made to Idaho Housing and that Ms Mitchell was not on the 
loan on the property and that since appellant quit claimed half the property to her, then 
she was nor are the respondents responsible for the payments. Except between 
September 2010 and 2013 the appellant did not have or own the property, as the 
respondent stated in his briefs. It was sold at Sheriff's sale in 2010. The order by the 
court as in argument # 1 was 'The judgment directs that a foreclosure sale shall be 
held with proceeds to be disbursed to first pay off the first lien of IHFA ... " How 
can the appellant be responsible for payments on property illegally taken away 
from him? Was the appellant suppose to make payments on the property he had 
no possession of or collected rents from? This is what the court was saying with 
the bombshell, first time ever brought to the attention of either party (unless there 
were some ex parte communication), since the appellant could not address this 
to the court when the court made this determination. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Bankruptcy Laws protect property su~ject to federal bankruptcy 
protection, and the respondents attached appellant's share of the property to sell 
bankruptcy protected property even without filing beyond the statute of limitation, and 
committed fraud on the court when it sold that property under another attorney's name, 
and dismissed the case so it could not be appealed from third district court, Then 
appellant to be awarded half the prope1iy, but not given control because the respondents 
had caught up the payments they fell behind (showing a ledger and cashier check) and 
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testifying that they had applied the cashier check to catch up payments and a ledger to 
that payments were current. And then to have this court inform appellant since 
""'"'L-,HJlf", that res j udicata did not apply to dismiss this case saying appellant was 
for the payments no matter how they got the property, lied about catching 
making payments and circumvented botµ this state and federal bankruptcy laws and 
to stop the appellant from appealing this 6ase by awarding exorbitant attorney fees 71 
days after judgment. Then when attempts were made to show appellant attempted to 
show he was not responsible for the payments when he did not own the property, the 
court dismisses the Second Motion to Reconsider as untimely. That the appellant 
requests this court to remand this to court for a jury trial with instructions on at least the 
issues of what transpired after the last court awarding half the property and denied 
proceeds giving the false accounting by the respondents and award costs. This court 
should determine that issues dealing with the falsifying documents, perjury and fraud 
committed during the court trial giving back half ownership of the property that led to 
this lawsuit. 
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MEMORANDlJM OF DECISION 
Appearances: 
David L. Posey, Payette, Idaho, Attorney for Debtor. 
Kelly I. Beeman, Boise, Idaho, Attorney for Creditors Dennis Sallaz 
and Jacqueline Mitchell. 
John Kromrnenhoek, Boise, Idaho, Chapter 13 Trustee. 
Chapter 13 Debtor Terrence Matthews has objected to the allowance 
of two proofs of claim, one filed by attorney Dennis Sallaz, and the other filed by 
Debtor's former spouse, Jacqueline Mitchell. Mr. Sallaz has also filed a motion to 






the confirming Debtor's Chapter 13 plan because, he says, it was 
procured by fraud. The Court conducted a consolidated evidentiary hearing 
concerning these matters on March 16, 2003. After due consideration of the 
evidence and arguments presented by the parties, together with the applicable law, 
the Comi enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. Fed. R. 
Bankr. P. 7052; 9014. 
Background and Facts 
From the record, the following facts appear undisputed and are, for 
convenience, presented below in two components. The first section deals with the 
procedural developments i11 Debtor's bankruptcy case, with a focus upon the 
notice provided to Mr. Sallaz and Ms. Mitchell. The second section deals with 
Debtor's valuation of certain real estate, which is the central issue in Mr. Sallaz' s 
motion to revoke the confirmation order. 
A. Debtor's Chapter 13 case. 
Debtor and Ms. Mitchell were divorced in a state court action in 
which Mr. Sallaz represented Ms. Mitchell. Thereafter, Debtor filed a petition for 
relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankrnptcy Code on March 24, 2003. Docket No. 
1 . The master mailing list of creditors submitted by Debtor at that time, see 
L.B.R. 1007.1, did not list Ms. Mitchell. It did, however, contain Tv1r. SaHa7.'s 








name and proper mailing address. Debtor's original Schedule D lists Ms. 
Desc 
as a secured creditor and lists Mr. Sallaz as an "(a]ssignee or other notification for 
[Ms.] Mitchell." Docket No. L Debtor's Amended Schedule D, filed on May 14, 
2003, omitted any mention of either Ms. Mitchell or Mr. Sallaz. Docket No. l 0. 
The Conrt's records show that on March 27, 2003, Mr. Sallaz was 
mailed a notice that Debtor had commenced a case under Chapter 13 of the 
Banlrn1ptcy Code, that a§ 34 l(a) 1 creditors' meeting would be held on April 25, 
2003, and that a confirmation hearing concerning Debtor's proposed plan, a copy 
of which was enclosed with the notice, would be held on May 27, 2003. On April 
2, 2003, Mr. Sallaz was sent a notice that the coufimmtion hearing had been 
rescheduled for June to, 2003. Docket No. 7. Apparently, Ms. Mitchell did not 
directly receive notice of any of these events or dates and it is unclear if Mr. Sallaz 
relayed any of the information in the notices he received to his client, Ms. 
Mitchell. 
Neither Ms. Mitchell nor Mr. Sallaz objected to confirmation of 
Debtor's proposed Chapter 13 plan. But just prior to the June IO confirmation 
hearing, the Chapter 13 trustee, Mr. Krommenhoek, filed a written 
recommendation opposing confinnation. Docket No. 13. From the Court's 
1 All statuto1y references are to title 11 of'the Unite<l States Code unless 
otherwise noted. 








it appears that the on 1y party voicing any concerns about confirmation of 
Debtor's plan was the trustee. The Court continued the confirmation hearing until 
July 8, 2003. However, the Court inforn1ed il1ose in attendance that if the trustee's 
concerns were resolved, he could so indicate by subrnitting an order confirming 
Debtor's plan bearing his signature approval, and the Court would enter the order 
and vacate the continued confmnati011 hearing. Minute Entry, Docket No. 14. lt 
appears that the trustee approved a confirrnatjon order on July 8; this order was 
submitted to and entered by the Court on July 9. Docket No. 17. Thus, a second 
confim1ation hearing was not held. 
Mr. Sallaz filed two proofs of claim on July 24, 2003, after the Court 
had already confumed Debtor's plan. Mr. Sallaz filed the first proof of claim on 
his own behalf, alleging Debtor owed him $10,632.68 for legal services provided 
to Ms. Mitchell. Proof of Claim No. 17. Mr. Sallaz filed the second proof of 
claim on behalf of Ms. Mitchell. In it, she alleges that Debtor owes her $109,000 
based upon the parties' divorce decree. Proof of Claim No. 18. 
Debtor objected to both proofa of claim on August 6, 2003. Docket 
Nos. 18, 19. Later, on February 9, 2004, Mr. Sallaz filed a motion requesting that 
the Court revoke the order confll1lling Debtor's Chapter 13 plan because, 
according to Mr. Sallaz, it had been obtained by fraud. Docket No. 29. More 








specifically, Mr. Sallaz suggests that the value Debtor had placed 011 four 
of real property was fraudulent. 
B. Debtor's valuation of real property. 
In the "Judgment and Decree of Divorce," entered in the divorce 
action on November 26, 2002, the state court identified the parties' community 
debts and community property. Proof of Cla:it:n No. 18, Attach. The divorce court 
ordered that the community real property be sold; that the community debts be 
paid from the proceeds; and that from any remaining proceeds, Ms. Mitchell be 
paid $18,000 as a reimbursement for her separate property contributions to the 
marriage, with any excess to be shared by the parties. Id. The state court also 
decreed that "[e]ach party shall be responsible for their attorney fees incurred 
herein, and said fees shall not be paid before the division of the community 
property as debts of the community." Proof of Claim No. 18, Attach. at 4--5. 
The state court made specific findings regarding four parcels ofreal 
property. Three parcels of property were identified as community property. Proof 
of Claim No. 18, Attach. at 2. These three community property parcels were 
valued as follows: 











1911 2nd St. South, Nampa, lD 
114 S. Boise Avenue, Emmett, ID 












The fourth parcel, located at 819 S. Conunercial, Emmett, Idaho, which was 
Debtor's separate property, was not valued by the state court, although Gem 
County had assessed its value at $60,370 for property tax purposes. Id. at 2-3; 
Aff. of Sallaz at 2, Docket No. 30. 
During the pendency of the divorce case, Mr. Sa11az filed notices of 
liens on the three properties located in Nampa, in Boise County, and at 114 S. 
Boise Ave, Emmett. Proof of Claim No. 17, Attachs. 1-3. These notices, all filed 
on July 18, 2002, advised that Mr. Sallaz claimed an attorney's lien on the 
property to secure payment of the fees he earned while representing Ms. Mitchell 
in the divorce action. 
Debtor's initial bankruptcy schedules listed the following 
infommtion concerning his real property: 







Property Location Market Value Encumbrances 
1911 2"d St. S0utl1, Nampa, ID (1/2 interest) $30,000 $69,768.72 
114 S. Boise Ave., Emmett, JD (Y2 interest ) $20,000 $40,557.64 
j Clear Creek Prop., Boise Co., ID (Vi interest) $20,000 $39,578.95 
819 S. Commercial, Emmett, ID $35,000 $29,183.64 
See Schedule A, Docket No. 1. 
On May 14, 2003, Debtor amended the values in his schedules as 
follows: 
Property Location Market Value Encumbrances 
1911 2"d St. South, Nampa, TD (V2 interest) $30,000 $54,658.84 
114 S. Bo.ise Avenue, Emmett, ID (Yz interest) $10,000 $22,449.62 
Clear Creek Prop., Boise Co., ID (V:. interest) $10,000 $22,332.96 
819 S. Commercial, Emmett, ID $35,000 $29,767.64 
See Am. Schedule A, Docket No. 10. 
Discussion and Disposition 
A. Debtor's objection to Ms. Mitchell's proof of claim. 
Debtor urges two grounds for disallowance of Ms. Mitchell's proof 
of claim.2 First, Debtor argues that the amount claimed due by Ms. Mitchell is 
2 Debtor's written objection to Ms. Mitchell's proof of daim, Docket No. 19, also 
alleges that Ms. Mitchell's claim was untimely filed. Debtor's counsel withdrew that 
argument at the hearing. 






premised on the values placed on the real property in the parties' divorce decree, 
and that because the bankruptcy estate does not include her interest in any fonner 
community property, Debtor owes Ms. Mitchell nothing. Secondly, Debtor argues 
that because he has appealed the divorce judgment, it is not final, and Ms. 
Mitchell's claim should not be allowed. 
The Conrt agrees in part with Debtor's analysis. Ms. Mitchell has 
obviously overstated her claim against Debtor and the bankruptcy estate:' Debtor 
docs not "owe" Ms. Mitchell any sums for her interest in the real property. 
Under the state court's decree of divorce, the parties' community 
ownership interest in the three parcels of real property was effectively terminated. 
Instead, under the decree, the parties became tenants in common as to these 
parcels until the property could be sold and the proceeds divided. See Idaho Code 
§ 32-712 (requiring courts to assign community property to the respective parties); 
Batra v. Batra, 17 P.3d 889,895 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (noting Idaho Codes 32-
712 reflects a policy of separating the parties' interests in property, giving each 
immediate control over their interests in community property); McNett v. McNett, 
501 P.2<l 1059, 1061 (Idaho 1960) (criticizing a trial court's decision to award real 
3 The applicable law regarding the shifting burdens of proof in claims litigation 
was clearly explained in Tn re Fahos, 03.1 l.B.C.R. 60, 61 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2003). There 
is no need to repeat that discussion here. 
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to fonner married persons as tenants in common because such ownership 
requires an ongoing relationship inconsistent with the goal of a divorce decree). 
\Vhile all community property becomes property of a bankruptcy estate when one 
spouse files a petition, see 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(2), the same is not trne of the co-
owned property of fonner spouses. Under these facts, Ms. Mitchell's one-half 
interest as a tenant in common in the co-owned real property did not become 
property of Debtor's bankruptcy estate; her interest in the real estate remains intact 
and unimpaired. Therefore, she docs not hold a valid "claim" against Debtor's 
bankruptcy estate that would in any way allow her to participate in distributions 
under Debtor's confirmed plan. Therefore, the amount stated in Ms. Mitchell's 
proof of claim attributable to her estimate of the value of the real property doeg not 
represent a debt, and must be disallowed. 
However, Ms. Mitchell's entitlement under the decree to an $18,000 
"reimbursement" from Debtor as a result of the state court's division of the parties' 
debts and property does constitute an allowable claim. Section JOl(lO)(A) of the 
Code defines "creditor" as including an ''entity that has a claim against the debtor 
.... " 11 U .S .C. § 101(10). ln turn, "claim" is defined as a "right to payment, 
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 9 
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Because tl1e state court effectively 
that Ms. Mitchell could recover the $18,000 "reimbursement" from property sale 
proceeds in which Debtor would otherwise be entitled to share, she has a 
cognizable "right to payment" for that amom1t. 
Ms. Mitchell offered no evidence that she holds a lien or other 
security interest in Debtor's interest in the real property to secure payment of this 
reimbursement claim. Notably, the state court divorce decree grants Ms. Mitchell 
no lien against Debtor's property to :=;ecure her right to payment. Therefore, for 
purposes of this bankruptcy case, Ms. Mitchell's claim is unsecured. 
The Court disagrees with Debtor's contention that the pendency of 
appeal of the state court divorce decree constitutes a basis to disallow her claim. 
As explained above, the Bankruptcy Code defines the tenn "claim" quite broadly 
and includes rights to payment that are disputed. 11 U.S.C. ~ 101(5). In Audre, 
Inc. v. Casey (In re Audre, Inc.), 216 B.R. 19, 32-33 (B.A.P. 9111 Cir. 1997), the 
Panel affomed the bankrnptcy court's decision not to estimate a claim based on a 
state family court judgment that was on appeal, but instead to allow the claim as 
filed. Although much of the Audre decision deals with the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine, the case does support the proposition that, for bankruptcy purposes, a 
claim based on a state court judgment subject to appeal is valid until such time as 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 10 
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state appellate court reverses. id.; see aiso In re Afitchell, 255 B.R. 345, 
358--61 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (explaining that a claim arising from a California 
family court judgment being appealed must be considered for Chapter t 3 
eligibility purposes); In re Keenan, 201 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) 
(rejecting the argument that a claim arising from a staie court judgment on appeal 
was subject to estimation by the bankruptcy court). Therefore, the fact that Debtor 
has appealed the state court's decree of divorce docs not, by itself, supply a reason 
to disallow Ms. Mitchell's claim. 
Because Debtor has successfully rebutted the prima facie validity of 
:Vls. Mitchell's claim, the Court will sustain Debtor's objectjon in part. Ms. 
Mitchell's claim will be allowed as an unsecured claim for $18,000, and she is 
entitled to share in distributions to unsecured creditors under Debtor's confinned 
Chapter 13 plan to that extent. The balance of her claim will be disallowed. 
B. Debtor's objection to Mr. Sallaz's proof of claim. 
Debtor objects to Mr. Sallaz's proof of claim because, he says, he 
owes Mr. Sallaz nothing.4 See Docket No. 18. To support this position, Debtor 
points to the language in the divorce decree quoted above providing that each party 
4 Dehtor's written objection to Mr. Sallaz's proof of claim, Docket No. 18, also 
alleges that Mr. Sallaz's claim was late filed. Debtor's counsel withdrew that argument at 
the;: hearing. 
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is responsible for the payment of bis or her own attorney fees. Debtor also 
suggests that because bis bankruptcy estate includes only Debtor's undivided one-
balf interest in the real property, Mr. Sallaz holds no Jien on any property of the 
bankruptcy estate. 
Clearly, the state court did not order Debtor to pay Ms. Mitchell's 
attorney's foes owed to Mr. Sallaz. In this sense, then, Debtor is not indebted to 
Mr. Sallaz. However, the Code definition of "creditor" also includes an "entity 
that has a community claim." 11 U.S.C. § 101( lO)(C). A "community claim" is 
one "that arose [prepetition] concerning the debtor for which property of the kind 
specified in section§ 54I(a)(2) of this title is liable, whether or not there is any 
such property at the time of the commencement of the case.'' l l U.S.C. § 101(7). 
Finally, 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(2) includes community property, as defined by 
applicable state law, in the bankruptcy estate. 
Again, as discussed above, when the state court entered its decree of 
divorce, Debtor and Ms. Mitchell ceased to mvn any community property. 
AfcNett, 50 l P.2d at 106 L In light of the language in the divorce decree making 
each party responsible only for his or her own legal fees, and the transformation 
that occurred upon the parties' divorce of community property into separate (albdt 





sorne cases co-owned) property, Mr. SaJiaz bas no basis to assert a claim 
Debtor's bankruptcy estate. 
Fnrthennore, the legitimacy of Mr. Sallaz's liens is doubtful, even 
were there any property of the bankruptcy estate to which those liens could attach. 
Tu Idaho, an attomey is limited 1n the types of liens that may be asserted against a 
client's property. Pennissib1e liens include either "possessory" or "charging" 
liens. See in re Dearborn Constr-, inc., 03.1 I.B.C.R. l7, 19 (Ban.kr. D. Idalw 
2002) (citing Frazee v. Frazee, 660 P.2d 928 (I<laho 1983)). Because Mr. Sallaz's 
liens are not asserted against any "documents, money or other property obtained in 
his professional capacity," Frazee, 660 P .2d at 929, he likely can not assert a 
possessory lieu against the real estate. And because a charging lien merely allows 
an attorney to assert an interest in a client's cause of action, and in any judgment 
or money award procured by the attorney's services, Idaho Code§ 3~205,-1 Mr. 
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and 
counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or 
implied, of the pmties, which is not restrained by law. From 
the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer 
containing a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a 
party has a lien upon his client's cause of action or 
counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision 
or judgment in his ciient's favor and the proceeds thereof 1n 
whosoever hands they may come; and can not be affected 
by any settlement between the parties before or after 
j udgrnent. 
Idaho Code§ 3-205. 
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Sallaz's liens on Debtor' s real property would not hkely be within his reach. See 
In re Harris, 258 B.R. 8, 13-14 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) (denying attorney' s claim 
of a charging lien in monies held by the trustee because there was no "fund" 
created by the attorney's services). Moreover, "[t]hc plain language of [Idaho 
Code § 3-205] a1lows a lien in favor of a lawyer solely against the lawyer's client, 
not against the adverse party to the litigation." Elsaesser v. Raeon (In re 
Goldberg), 235 B.R. 476, 484-85 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999) (citing Frazee, 660 P.2d 
at 930). Given the facts here, Mr. Sallaz has not shown has he holds a valid lien 
on any property of the Debtor or bankruptcy estate to secure payment of his fees. 
If he bolds valid liens at all (which the Court doubts) such would attach only to his 
client's interest in the co-owned property, and not to Debtor's interest in the land. 
Debtor's objection to Mr. Sallaz's proof of claiJn will be sustained, and the claim 
will be disallowed. 
C. The motion to revoke the order confirming Debtor's Chapter 13 
plan. 
Mr. Sallaz asks the Court to revoke its order confinning Debtor's 
Chapter 13 plan arguing that Debtor and his attorney engaged in fraud. Motion to 
Revoke, Docket No. 29. This is an extremely serious allegation, but, as shown 
below, there is nothing in the record to support it. Multiple reasons exist to deny 
this motion. 







I First, the Court has determined above that Mr. Sallaz is not a 
"creditor" in this case. Section § l330(a) provides that an order confirming a plan 
may be revoked "[o]n request of a party in interest .... " Under these facts, the 
Court seriously doubts Mr. Sallaz has standing to request relief from the Court 
Second, even assuming he has standing, or presuming :instead that he 
can rely upon the standing of Ms. Mitchell, his client, the motion is not timely 
filed. The Code requires that a request to revoke an order confinning a Chapter 13 
plan be filed "at any time within 180 days after the date of the entry of an order of 
confrrmation under section 1325 of this title .... " 11 U.S.C. § 1330(a). The 
order confrrming Debtor's Amended Chapter 13 Plan was entered on July 9, 2003. 
Docket No. l 7. :Vlr. Sallaz did not file his motion to revoke this order until 
February 9, 2004. Docket No. 29. Jt appears Mr. Sallaz was given proper, timely 
notice of the commencement of the bankruptcy case. No credible explanation has 
been offered why Mr. Sallaz, and through him, Ms. Mitchell, failed to involve 
themselves in Debtor;s bankruptcy case so that their arguments that Debtor had 
grossly undervalued the real estate could have been timely advanced prior to 
confinnation. See, e.g., In re Ramey. 301 B.R. 534, 545 (Ban.kr. E.D. Ark. 2003) 
("If a creditor fails to object to treatment of its claim in the plan, the creditor will 
suffer the consequences."); in re Rupert, 90 I.B.C.R. 2)6, 218 (Banlcr. D. Idaho 
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(imputing knowledge relevant notices to the creditor when the notices 
were directed to the creditor's attorney). 
In disposing of similar motions in the past, the Court has also 
considered whether the mov:ing party may alternatively rely upon Bankruptcy Ruic 
9024, which incorporates Ped. R. Civ. P. 60, as a basis for setting aside a Chapter 
13 confin11ation order. See Carrier v. Croner (Tn re Croner), 99. 1 T.B.C.R. l 6. 18 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1999). However, Rule 9024 provides that while Rule 60 applies 
in cases under title 11, ''a complaint to revoke an order con:finning a plan may be 
filed only within the time allowed by ... ~ 1330.'' Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9024. 
Moreover, recent case law on this issue instructs that § 1330, and not Rule 60(b), 
is the exclusive basis to seek revocation of a Chapter l 3 confinnation order.6 See 
Mason v. Young (In re Young)) 237 B.R. 791,803 (B.A.P. 10t1• Cir. 1999); Educ. 
Credit Afgmt. Corp. v. Robinson (In re Rohinson), 293 B.R. 59, 66 (Bankr. D. Or. 
2002). 
6 In another case interpreting§ 1330, the comi denied relief when the creditor 
knew of the allegedly fraudulent acts prior to confirmation and failed to time1y raise the 
issue. Bright v. Ritacco (In re Ritacco), 598 B.R. 595, 598-99 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997) 
The Court'il record in this case reflects that Mr. Sallaz had notice of the values Debtor 
listed in his schedules well in advance of confirmation. Without expressly adopting the 
holding of In re Ritacco, the Court notes it would provide yet another n:ason to deny Ml'. 
Sallaz's motion. 
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Desc 
In short, the motion is late~filed and no legitimate basis exists to 
disregard the statutory 180-day bar found in § 1330 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Another problem with Mr. Sallaz's approach relates to the procedure 
he employed to request relief. The Bankruptcy Rules and case law make it clear 
that a party seeking to revoke a Chapter 13 confu'mation order must proceed via an 
adversary proceeding. not by motion. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(5) ("The following 
are adversary proceedings: ... a proceeding to revoke an order of confim1ation of 
a chapter ... 13 plan .... "); see also In re Schumacher, 89 J.B.C.R. 134, 135 
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1989) ("An action to revoke an order of confinnation requires the 
filing of a complaint in ru1 adversary proceeding."). The procedure used by Mr. 
Sallaz in this case is therefore defective. 
For each of the above reasons, the motion must be denied. However, 
under the circumstances, the Court feels compelled to c011nnent on the merits the 
allegations made by Mr. Sallaz against Debtor and his bankruptcy attorney. In 
short, Mr. Sallaz totally failed to demonstrate through any competent evidence that 
the confinnation order in this case was procured by fraud as required by § 1330(a). 
To revoke a Chapter 13 confirmation order on the basis of fraud, the creditor must 
prove that: ( l) the debtor made a representation; (2) the debtor knew the 
representation was false when it was made; (3) the representation was made with 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 17 
'%A072A 
(Rev R/81) 
II 011}1")4 15:28:00 
O! 2'fll' 
intent to deceive; (4) the creditor relied on the representation; and (5) 
creditor was damaged as a result of the representation. Credit Gen. Ins. Co. v. 
Briscoe (In re Briscoe), 90 I.B.C.R. 57, 58-59 (Baukr. D. Idaho 1990). 
Here, Debtor testified that the initial figures listed in his bankniptcy 
schedules represented his best estimates of the value of the respective properties at 
the time of his bankruptcy filing. The Court accepts this testimony. Debtor's 
opinion of value was based on his experience in buying and renting the properties. 
However, Debtor also explained that he had not visited all the properties during 
the course of his divorce proceedings, and as a result, he lacked personal 
knowledge about the current condition of the properties 1 and this impacted the 
accuracy of his valuation. When Debtor was fiJ1ally able to inspect his properties, 
he discovered significant damage had occurred to the premises occasioned by the 
tenants' occupancy and the weather. As a result, Debtor felt the properties had 
significantly decreased in value. lu addition, the amounts owed on the 
encumbrances against the properties had changed over tirne, When Debtor 
realized the values and lien balances were substantially different than what he had 
listed in his schedules, he amended those schedules. Debtor's testimony stands 
unrefuted. 
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Mr. Sallaz argues that because the values Debtor listed his 
bankruptcy schedules were lower than those found by the state court in the divorce 
action, Debtor's scheduled values were false. Therefore, Mr. Sallaz alleges Debtor 
and his attorney must have intended to perpetrate a fraud on t11e bankruptcy court 
by advancing the lower values. The evidence fails to support any such inference. 
Debtor provided credib 1e testimony as to how he arrived at the values he listed, 
why he subsequently amended the values, and why the values were different that 
those used by the state court.7 Mr. Sallaz presented no evidence to the contrary. 
Mr. Sallaz' s motion to revoke the confinnation order will be denicd.8 
7 Some of Debtor's testimony on this issue reflects a lack of understanding on his 
part concerning how disputed Hens should be taken rnto account in valuing the prope1iics. 
In this case, such misunderstanding is not an indicator of fraud. 
8 Further comment on the lack of merit conceming this motion is warranted in 
this case From all appearances, it is doubtful that Mr. Sallaz or his attomcy conducted 
much research, if any, concerning the applicable time limit or approp1iate procedure for 
seeking revocation of the confirn1ation order. in addition, given the elements required 
under the published case law to prove the confirmation order was procured by fraud, the 
Cou1i is skeptical whether there was any factual basis for the relief sought. The 
procedural flaws with the motion noted by the Court above, coupled with the dearth of 
any evidence that Debtor or his attorney acted improperly, arguably render the motion 
frivolous. Debtor and his counsel have not asked for an awurd of attorney fees or costs 
incurred in defending against the motion, and the Court will resist the temptation to 
independently impose sanctions in this case. instead, the Cou1t strongly recommends that 
Mr. Sallaz and his attorney review the mandate of Fed. R. I3ankr. P. 9011 when again 
considering filing pleadings in this Court alleging that someone is guilty of fraud. 
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The motion to revoke the order confirming Debtor's plan is time 
baned, procedurally flawed, and even if it were uot, no competent evidence was 
offered at the hearing to show tlrnt the entry of the order was, in any fashion, 
procured by fraud. For these reasons, the motion will be denied. 
Debtor's objection to Mr. Sallaz' s proof of claim will be sustained 
and the claim will be disallowed. Mr. Sallaz holds no enforceable claim against 
Debtor or any property of the bankruptcy estate. 
Debtor's objection to Ms. Mitche1l's proof of claim will be sustained 
and the claim disallowed in part. Ms. Mitchen has failed to show that she holds a 
secured claim against Debtor or the bank:rnptcy estate for the value of her interest 
in the paiiies' co-owned real estate. However, she does hold an unsecured claim 
against Debtor for $18,000 for the reimbursement ordered by the state divorce 
court. Her claim will be allowed in this amount. 
DATED This 15• davi 2004. 
-------:li.--J.--
J IM D. PAPPAS 
CHIEF U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE 
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